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English common law reports are dense with ideas. Yet they remain mostly untapped by 
intellectual historians. This article reveals how the history of ideas can engage with law and 
jurisprudence by following the notion that ‘infidels’ (specifically non-Christian individuals) 
deserved to receive exceptional treatment within England and across the globe. The starting 
point is Sir Edward Coke: he suggested that infidels could be conquered and constitutionally 
nullified, he suggested they could be traded with only at the discretion of the monarch, and 
he confirmed their incapacity to enjoy full access to the common law. This article will 
uncover how each of these assertions influenced the development of the imperial constitution 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when it came to war, trade, and slavery. 
Identifying each of the major moves away from Coke’s prejudices, this article argues that 
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The history of law must be a history of ideas. It must represent to us not merely what men 
have done and said, but what men have thought in bygone ages. […] [W]e must infer what 
people thought in the past from what they wrote. 
 
F. W. Maitland, “The Corporation Aggregate,” 1893.1  
 
 
The English common law relies upon the abilities of counsel and judges to interpret and 
evaluate precedents. This makes the law reports, which record the argumentation used to 
inform the judgments subsequently offered as precedents, critical to the process of 
administering justice. So they are today, as they were in the early modern period, when the 
industry professionalised. As reports became produced in large quantities and consumed by 
students, so too were they eradicated of variations in language, style, and substance. Whether 
adjectival or declaratory, all of the ideas found within the reports could then be seen to fall, as 
still they can today, into one of two categories: ratio decidendi, which is the reasoning behind 
a specific decision that binds later judges, and obiter dictum, which is an observation hashed 
out in the course of reaching a specific decision that is not considered to bind judges but may 
nevertheless be persuasive to them. This article will concern itself principally with dicta in 
order to consider the circumstances whereby they have come to be discredited or used to 
develop new precedents in the context of legal and political crises associated with trade, war, 
and slavery. Specifically it will look at those circumstances which compelled individuals 
working within the English common law to consider the idea that infidels were somehow 
different to Christians. Inspired by work at the crossroads of legal history and the intellectual 
                                                   
1 Frederic William Maitland, “The Corporation Aggregate: The History of a Legal Idea” (unpublished lecture, 
25th May, 1893). 
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history of the British Empire, this article presents a novel way to write the history of ideas.2  
This involves setting aside, but never forgetting, some of the best-known treatises and 
pamphlets in history, political philosophy, and political economy, in order to take jurisprudence 
seriously on its own terms.3 Approaching the law reports in their totality, and in isolation, 
encourages us to think like common lawyers did: for them, no material was more important 
than these reports. They represent a repository of ideas. Furthermore, and this is not trifling, 
here is an approach that allows for some consideration as to how far the trajectory of any single 
idea may be determined by the medium of its presentation. 
 
This article begins with a consideration of perhaps the most important English common lawyer 
of his time, Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634). Coke was a man who expressed a number of the 
profound constitutional anxieties peculiarly associated with the Tudor-Stuart transition. For J. 
G. A. Pocock, it was at this very moment that there began to flourish a kind of ‘historical 
thought’ especially idealistic of timeless custom. It has been tempting for some legal historians 
to simplify and contort Pocock’s argument to suggest that, as the royal prerogative came to be 
used and misused by Stuart kings, so too did the “common law mind” look with greater 
                                                   
2 Recent intellectual histories of empire which take law seriously include Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, 
Property and Empire, 1500-2000 (Cambridge, 2014); Richard Bourke, Empire and Revolution: The Political Life 
of Edmund Burke (Princeton, 2015); Duncan Bell, Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire 
(Princeton, 2015). The classic text is still David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire 
(Cambridge, 2000). Intellectual legal histories include Alan Cromartie, Sir Matthew Hale: Law, Religion, and 
Natural Philosophy (Cambridge, 1995); Alan Cromartie, The Constitutionalist Revolution: An Essay on the 
History of England (Cambridge, 2006); Michael Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence, 1760-
1850 (Oxford, 1991); Michael Lobban, A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Common Law World, 1600-
1900 (Dordrecht, 2007); Thomas Poole, Reason of State: Law, Prerogative and Empire (Cambridge, 2015). The 
pioneer of this tradition was Maitland, of course. 
3 This is not, of course, to suggest that the law reports represent the only place where law was discussed and acted 
out in the making of modern empires. Historians continue to maintain that ‘legal posturing’ was performed in a 
variety of different contexts by colonists, merchants, mid-level bureaucrats, governors, ministers, crown law 
officers, diplomats, and others who together shaped the legal mind of imperialism. Ronald Robinson and John 
Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (Basingstoke, 1982); 
Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires (Cambridge, 2009); Lauren 
Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 1800-1850 
(Cambridge, MA, 2016); Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern 
Foundations of the British Empire in India (Oxford, 2011).  
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selectivity and insularity into the English medieval past for evidence of institutional stability 
perseverant of that prerogative.4 Coke’s pronouncements in Calvin’s Case (1608) may be seen 
in this light, though it is more difficult to see all of Coke’s offerings upon the subject of infidels 
in a similar way. Besides running the risk of overlooking some subtleties of distinction between 
dicta and ratio in his jurisprudence, more recent scholars, like David Chan Smith and Ian 
Williams, have persuasively cautioned against seeing Coke’s approach to the powers of crown, 
parliament, and common law as inflexible. Instead we might rather see Coke as somewhat more 
of a reformist than he has been allowed by the strictest proponents of the theory that his ‘ancient 
constitutionalism’ was entirely oppositional to the royal prerogative.5  
 
Commerce and empire were crucial to the modernisation of the English common law. Scholars 
of Calvin’s Case and the imperial constitution have long appreciated this.6 What is less 
common among historians, however, is an approach which takes a selection of Coke’s ideas 
on the same topic from different sources in order to follow these through the jurisprudence. 
Doing so, as this article does, reveals how lawyers and judges responded to developments at 
home and abroad. The jurist of most importance in this frame will be Lord Mansfield (1705-
93), whose reputation for intervention made him a favourite among private law reporters then, 
and historians now.7 As a revamping Chief Justice, Mansfield made a sport of discrediting 
                                                   
4 J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study in English Historical Thought in the 
Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, 1987), esp. 30-69. See also Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient 
Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-1642 (Basingstoke, 1992). 
5 David Chan Smith, Sir Edward Coke and the Reformation of the Laws: Religion, Politics and Jurisprudence, 
1578-1616 (Cambridge, 2014); Ian Williams, ‘Edward Coke’, in Denis Galligan, ed., Constitutions and the 
Classics: Patterns of Constitutional Thought from Fortescue to Bentham (Oxford, 2014); Cromartie, 
Constitutionalist Revolution, 179-233. For doubts about the ability to generalise about a “common law mind”, see 
J. W. Tubbs, The Common Law Mind: Medieval and Early Modern Conceptions (Baltimore, 2000).  
6 Daniel J. Hulsebosch, “The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British 
Jurisprudence,” Law and History Review, 21/3 (2003), 439-82; Gavin Loughton, “Calvin’s Case and the Origins 
of the Rule Governing ‘Conquest’ in English Law,” Australian Journal of Legal History, 8 (2004), 143-80; Poole, 
Reason of State, esp. 19-167. 
7 See especially James Oldham, The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth 
Century, 2 vols (Chapel Hill, 1992); James Oldham, English Common Law in the Age of Mansfield (Chapel Hill, 
2004). 
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Coke’s dicta, conscious of the need to make the common law more functional within a 
religiously tolerant commercial society such as Great Britain, he thought, should become.8 
Between Coke and Mansfield there lived John Holt (1642-1710), who is thoroughly interesting 
for managing to survive the officeholding upheavals of the 1680s to become a proponent of the 
unpopular idea of imposing limitations on government.9 This article will suggest moreover that 
a number of Holt’s observations about infidels within debates about conquest, commerce, and 
slavery became influential in the development of the imperial constitution in his lifetime too. 
As Holt and his colleagues were made to engage with Coke’s assertions about infidels, they 
were also confronted with an odd adaptation of these ideas, that is, one which suggested that 
the faithlessness of heathen slaves could provide for the possibility of recognising property in 
them.  
 
By no means, it is important to qualify, did Coke introduce the concept of faith into the English 
legal tradition. In the Middle Ages, tenants abided by the feudal expectation that an oath of 
fidelity (or “fealty”) was owed to their lords. Analogical to this was the expectation that clerks, 
merchants, and men of religion from Christendom beyond England were required to profess, 
upon arrival into the realm, their fidelity to the king (ad fidem regis).10 Separate to this was the 
qualification of good faith (bona fide) for actions and obligations. This was a recognisable 
standard for individual interactions within the later medieval common law, just as it had been 
civilians, canonists, and theologians on the continent.11 A requirement of faithfulness was even 
                                                   
8 David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined (Cambridge, 1989), 88-121. 
9 Philip A. Hamburger, “Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt's Opinion in City of London v. Wood,” 
Columbia Law Review, 94/7 (1994), 2091-2153. 
10 For aliens, birthright, and status in England, see Keechang Kim, Aliens in Medieval Law: The Origins of Modern 
Citizenship (Cambridge, 2000). 
11 James Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers and Infidels: The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250-
1550 (Liverpool, 1979); Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and 
Church Law, 1150-1625 (Michigan, 2001); James Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of the Modern Contract 
Doctrine (Oxford, 1991), esp. 30-68; Martin Joseph Schermaier, “Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law,” in 
Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, eds., Good Faith in European Contract Law (Cambridge, 2000), 
63-92; James Gordley, “Good Faith in the Medieval Ius Commune,” Zimmermann and Whittaker, Good Faith, 
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set out in the very name of the action at common law which developed in the sixteenth century 
to account for contracts (assumpsit et fideliter promisit).12  
 
By contrast, what pertained within English law to faithlessness – specifically the inability to 
keep faith with other Christians – was obscure ever since the early emergence of this prejudice 
around the time of the Crusades. It may have been natural for William of Newburgh (1136-
1198) to associate the Jews of York with “perfidy,” for this had become something of an 
ethnographic trope across western Europe since at least Isidore of Seville (560-636), but how 
far such rhetoric can be said to have influenced English law is certainly a question.13 Lots of 
Jews bought and sold land and other things in England without much difficulty or harassment; 
or, at least, they did until 1290, when Edward I orchestrated a widespread eviction of Jews 
entirely on the basis of what he perceived to be the pernicious effects of their money-lending, 
rather than their faithlessness.14 With England purged of its Jewish population during the 
fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, that left few subjects of the realm around to 
identify openly as non-Christians – and none, it is surely more important for the purposes of 
this article, to record their pleas before the courts of common law. Not until 1520 was the 
inability of a “pagan” to have an action at common law first observed by Justice Richard Broke 
on a case of trespass in the Court of Common Pleas: to Broke’s mind, the circumstances of that 
case – concerning the disputed ownership between two Christian Englishmen of a bloodhound 
– required a distinction between damages and injury, for which purpose it was necessary to run 
                                                   
93-117; Wim Decock, Theologians and Contract Law: The Moral Transformation of the Ius Commune (ca. 1500-
1650) (Leiden, 2013). 
12 David Ibbetson, Historical Introduction to Law of Obligations (Oxford, 1999), 126-52. 
13 Bat-Sheva Albert, “Isidore of Seville: His Attitude Towards Judaism and his Impact on Early Medieval Canon 
Law,” Jewish Quarterly Review, 80 3/4 (1990), 207-20; Wolfram Drews, The Unknown Neighbour: The Jew in 
the Thought of Isidore of Seville (Leiden, 2006).  
14 Paul Hyams, “The Jews in Medieval England,” in Alfred Haverkamp and Hanna Vollrath, eds., England and 
Germany in the High Middle Ages (Oxford, 1996); Paul Hyams, “Faith, Fealty and Jewish ‘Infidels’ in Twelfth-
Century England,” in Sarah Rees Jones and Sethina Watson, eds., Christians and Jews in Angevin England (York, 
2013), 125-47; P. Elman, “The Economic Causes of the Expulsion of the Jews in 1290,” Economic History 
Review, 7/2 (1937), 145-54.  
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through the legal disabilities of outlaws, traitors, and pagans (all of whom featured alongside 
women and villeins).15 Pagans belonged to this motley crew of common-law rejects owing to 
their inability to keep faith and swear oaths, a disability that was subsequently expanded, 
through legislation, to make them out to be the enemies of the crown.16  
 
In other words, whereas good faith could attach itself to customs governing the intention and 
performance of individuals within contractual relations, and fidelity could attach itself to the 
symbolism and ceremony of loyalty and ligeance, infidelity was a vague condition of legal 
disability up to the end of the Tudor period. Coke’s importance owes to his association of 
infidels with three particular characteristics in the early seventeenth century: infidels could be 
conquered and taken over in toto; infidels could be traded with only at the discretion of the 
monarch; infidels could never give evidence at common law. While these novelties were 
conceived in England from dicta and commentaries offered to explain conditions in England, 
their effects would be most remarkable beyond the British Isles. Lawyers at home and abroad 
had no choice but to return to Coke time and again to make sense of the developing imperial 
constitution from the earliest settlement at Jamestown to the aftermath of the Seven Years’ 
War. As a result, a variety of different colonial interests were drawn into contemplations of 
their activities in relation to Coke’s feelings about infidels. At different times, chartered 
corporations, private traders, slavers, planters, and settlers were affected in their own different 
ways by the idea of infidels.  
 
                                                   
15 Y[ear] B[ooks] Trin. 12 Hen. VIII, fo. 4, pl. 3 (1520.003ss): “Et home foit faire damage a moy, & ne faire 
injury (damnum absque injuria); Come si l' Seignior bate son villein, ou l' baron sa feme, ou on bate un home 
utlage ou traitor, ou pagan, ils n' auront accion, pur ceo qu ilz ne sont pas able de suir action.” For the observation 
that the reference here to pagans is “esoteric,” see J. H. Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume 
VI: 1483-1558 (Oxford, 2003), 598n13.  
16 The earliest statutory expression of “infidels,” found in a few Tudor statutes, recurs with similarly miscellaneous 
association to other foes of the crown: each of the Treason Acts of 1534, 1551, and 1571 takes aim at “any person” 
that might be “an Heretick, Schismatick, Tyrant, Infidel or Usurper of the Crown.” See Treasons Act (1534), 26 
Hen. VIII, c. 13; Treason Act (1551), 5-6 Edw. VI, c. 11; Treason Act (1571), 13 Eliz. I, c. 1.  
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In his assessment of Protestant wariness towards infidels in early modern empires, Richard 
Tuck argues that the idea of maintaining distance from non-Christians because they were non-
Christians had finally become absurd by the early eighteenth century. Within the English 
common law tradition, Tuck sees East India Company vs Thomas Sandys (1683-5) as the 
turning point, despite judgment in that case actually supporting Coke’s argument for the 
prerogative to impose restrictions upon trading with infidels.17 This article will suggest, 
instead, that it was not until the other side of the Glorious Revolution that Coke’s views upon 
infidel disability were abandoned. Additionally, it is acknowledged here that prohibiting 
communication and trade with infidels was only one of the hindrances faced by non-Christians 
in English law: when it came to the circumstances of conquered infidels, Coke’s dicta were not 
dismissed definitively until the delivery of Lord Mansfield’s adjudication in Campbell v Hall 
(1774), it is shown below. When it came to the assertion that infidelity provided for a qualified 
property in slaves, again it was Lord Mansfield, in Somerset v Stewart (1772), who did the 
same.  
 
In conclusion, this article will reveal how the question of non-Christian deposition provides a 
fine way to understand, per Maitland, “what people thought in the past” not only about infidels 
but the entire common law enterprise. Here, as with every one of the major turning points 
presented in this article, we see one of two tendencies shown by common lawyers on the topic 




                                                   
17 Richard Tuck, “Alliances with Infidels in the European Imperial Expansion,” in Sankar Muthu, ed., Empire and 
Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, 2012), 61-83. 
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“THE COMMON LAW WORKS ITSELF PURE” [Conclusion] 
 
This article has shown how, piecemeal, after Nightingale, judges in the English courts of 
common law aggressively queried many of the incapacities associated with the legal 
personality of infidels. Certainly the most stubborn of these incapacities to carry into the 
eighteenth century was the inability of infidels to give evidence in court. It is ironic that some 
of the earliest moves away from Broke and Coke on this head concerned only Christians. In 
Wells v Williams (1697), for example, the plaintiff was a French Protestant who brought a suit 
for the recovery of debts. His action was queried owing to his status as an “alien enemy,” it 
was alleged for Williams, amid the Nine Years War. “But now,” counsel for Wells retorted, 
“commerce has taught the world more humanity.”  
 
It was beginning to teach the world political economy, as well. At the end of so many years of 
making new enemies on the continent, it was never so evident to common lawyers that it was 
now necessary to retain peaceful foreign merchants “sub protectione” in England, and to 
provide them with the fullest capacity to maintain actions at law. Finding for the French 
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plaintiff, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas also took the opportunity to affix to the 
judgment a repudiation not only of Coke’s dictum about perpetui inimici but also Broke’s 
dictum about pagans in the Year Books of Henry VIII.18 The Chief Justice in question was 
George Treby, who as counsel for Thomas Sandys had been the first to take issue with Coke’s 
pronouncements on infidels thirteen years earlier, however losing as he did on that occasion. 
Treby could now try to set things right, if only with his own dicta. As such, that left it up to 
later judges to determine if they could be used to overturn preceding dicta and custom touching 
the inability of non-Christians to bring actions and give evidence in court. Herein we see a 
recurring trend in the early modern common law, a trend which, this article has argued, can 
best be understood by historians of ideas sensitive to the contingencies of personae, politics, 
and pragmatism, all of which together shaped the laws of England and its empire. The 
replacement of old dicta with new dicta amounts to more than just a thing of jurisprudence; it 
reveals the history of political and economic ideas at work. 
 
Few examples illustrate this phenomenon better than Omychund v Barker (1744), which 
allowed Hindus to swear oaths, and present depositions, in pursuit of debts from the East India 
Company. Great Britain, at this stage, was strategically embedded into an alliance against 
France, amid a global fight over monarchy and religion that was soon to reach the shores of 
the Carnatic. All the while, the first intellectual strides were being made towards embracing 
“commercial society” and abandoning all “jealousy of trade.’19 It was in this context that the 
law officers of the crown were appointed counsel to “witnesses of the Gentoo religion” before 
                                                   
18 Wells v Williams (1697) 91 ER 46: ‘for though there be a difference between our religion and theirs, that does 
not oblige us to be enemies to their persons; they are the creatures of God, and of the same kind as we are, and it 
would be a sin in us to hurt their persons’. See also Wells v Williams (1697) 91 ER 1086. 
19 David Hume had recently published the first edition of his Essays Moral and Political (1741), wherein he 
decried the “great Jealousy” of nations with regard to commerce, being the rudiments of a more developed 
argument in “Jealousy of Trade” (1758) for all nations to adopt “enlarged and benevolent” policies of trade 
towards each other. See David Hume, Essays, Moral and Political (Edinburgh, 1741), 180-2 (“Of Liberty and 
Despotism”); David Hume, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (London, 1758), 187-9 (“Of the Jealousy of 
Trade”). 
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Chancery late in 1744. “It is of the greatest moment,” argued the attorney general, Dudley 
Rider, “that we should have commerce and correspondence with all mankind; trade requires it, 
policy requires it, and in dealings of this kind it is of infinite consequence, there should not be 
a failure of justice.” These sentiments were then advanced, in the framework of an argument 
for a reforming common law tradition, by the capable solicitor general, William Murray 
(twelve years before swearing into the King’s Bench as Lord Mansfield). For the young 
Mansfield, Coke’s remarks from the Institutes were “not warranted by any authority, nor 
supported by any reason, and lastly contradicted by common experience.” Recognising, 
further, that the age of discovery had given way to the age of global commerce, Mansfield 
argued that the statutory requirement for providing oaths had fallen out of step with the times, 
warning that Chancery, if careless, may commit the same error: 
 
All occasions do not arise at once; now a particular species of Indians appears; hereafter 
another species of Indians may arise; a statute very seldom can take in all cases, 
therefore the common law, that works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of 
justice, is for this reason superior to an act of parliament.20 
 
Expressions like this were to become emblematic of a common law tradition that could look 
just as comfortable tearing strips off its competing institutions as it could in Coke’s time. That 
Edmund Burke, during the impeachment of Warren Hastings before the Lords, would “use 
Lord Mansfield’s expression” about the common law and the fountain of justice, while making 
the case for “conforming our Jurisprudence to the Growth of our Commerce and of our 
Empire,” suggests something of the circumstantial importance of the expression.21  
                                                   
20 Omychund v Barker (1744), 26 ER 21, 22-3. 
21 Edmund Burke, “Debates on Evidence” (30 April 1794), in The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, ed. 
P. J. Marshall and William B. Todd, vol. 7 (Oxford, 2000), 168-9. See Lieberman, 88-98; Bourke, Empire and 
Revolution, 820-50. 
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Mansfield’s quickly iconic description of the common law working itself pure is all the more 
interesting because of its utterance before the Lord Chancellor in a court of equity. There, not 
only was his opinion shared, but the idea would be pushed even further by his senior colleague, 
John Willes, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. Willes argued more persuasively than 
Mansfield that the common law had to purge its impurities in order to make Christian toleration 
compatible with undiscriminatingly free trade. Not only bad statutes, but bad dicta, too, had to 
be discarded in the process. Obstructing infidels from maintaining an action in English courts 
was “contrary not only to the scripture but to common sense and common humanity […]; and 
besides the irreligion of it, it is a most impolitic notion and would at once destroy all that trade 
and commerce from which this nation reaps such great benefits.”22 Now in a new Christian 
spirit of commerce, Hindu men were allowed to present depositions in the courts. Tradition 
could not entirely be abandoned in the process, however: it was clarified that Hindu testimony 
was permissible only because Hindus believed in their own deity.23 
 
Part of the magic of the English common law, from the old Year Books through to the present, 
is the motivation it gives to its practitioners to engage with old contexts for the purpose of 
evaluating the reiteration of dicta and ratio in changing political and economic circumstances. 
In one sense, the common lawyers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries worked more as 
intellectual historians than their continental colleagues did, if only by the antiquity of the 
actions, the formality of the pleadings, and the encouragement they received to recall 
precedents in context. In another sense, however much they hoped to avoid reliving the 
mistakes of their ancestors, the deliberate and self-preservationist insularity of their profession 
                                                   
22 Omichund v Barker (1744) 125 ER 1312, seeing also 26 E.R. 15. Compare Mary Collins v Lord Boyd (1755) 
at Morison’s Dictionary of Decisions, 9608  
23 English law was ecumenical before it was agnostic, while atheists waited for the Oaths Act (1888), 51 & 52 
Vict., c. 46. 
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instilled in its practitioners a need to keep a little distance from debates in the Commons, 
coffeehouse gossip, and the writings of men like Bacon, Hobbes, Child, Locke, Hume, Smith, 
and Burke. Sometimes, undoubtedly, counsel and judges translated many of these externalities 
into the bespoke vocabulary of the common law. But at other times, they were clearly ahead of 
the curve, anticipating rather than responding to broader political changes.  
 
Following infidels through this common law world reveals, firstly, a willingness to adapt old 
rules for new circumstances coupled, secondly, with a fear of moving too far from the 
precedents of old case law. Now, both of these characteristics are still attributable to common 
lawyers today, well after the globalisation of their enterprise (a development, it needs only be 
added, that might not have occurred if its strong intolerance towards non-Christians had not 
been expunged). 
